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A growing consensus suggests that incarcerating offenders tends to have either null or 
criminogenic effects at both the individual and neighborhood levels. There is also further 
evidence that there are unintended consequences of incarcerating juvenile offenders such as 
delayed psychosocial development and school dropout. The current study considers a much less 
examined hypothesis—that correctional environments can facilitate the accumulation of 
“criminal capital” and might actually encourage offending by serving as a school of crime. Using 
unique panel data from a sample of serious juvenile offenders, we are able to identify the 
criminal capital effect by considering illegal earnings and information regarding institutional 
stays over a seven year period. We have two separate measures that tap into the different 
mechanisms by which offenders can acquire criminal capital within institutions: the prevalence 
of friends in the facility who have committed income generating crimes and the length of 
institutional stays as a cumulative dosage. We find that both facility measures have independent 
positive effects on an individual’s daily illegal wage rate, even after controlling for important 
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There are approximately 80,000 youth in the U.S. who are placed in institutions each year 
at the cost of billions of dollars annually (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
2012). Yet despite considerable resources and investments in these facilities to both protect 
society and reform offenders, institutional placement1 of juvenile offenders often has unintended 
consequences. A growing consensus suggests that incarcerating offenders tends to have either 
null or criminogenic effects at both the individual (Nagin, Cullen and Jonson, 2009; Tonry, 
1999) and neighborhood levels (Clear, Rose and Ryder, 2001; Fagan, West and Holland, 2003). 
For instance, Nieuwbeerta, Nagin and Blokland (2009) found that first time imprisonment was 
associated with an increase in subsequent criminal activity, while in a study using data from a 
population of Florida offenders Bales and Piquero (2012) found that imprisonment produced a 
criminogenic effect on re-offending compared to non-incarcerative sanctions. This criminogenic 
effect is heightened when incarcerating adolescents. For example, Loughran et al. (2009) not 
only found that there was no marginal benefit to longer institutional placements for juveniles, but 
also that the likelihood of re-arrest and reoffending was no different, and perhaps slightly higher 
for juveniles who were placed in institutions compared to those given probation.   
                                                           
1 To be clear, juvenile offenders are placed in various types of settings, each with a different focus (e.g. correctional 
vs. residential). We use the term “institution” to represent all settings in which juveniles are placed. 
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In addition to potentially criminogenic effects, there are further unintended consequences 
of institutionalizing juvenile offenders. Adolescents who are institutionalized are at a key 
developmental phase of their life and as such are especially vulnerable to negative outcomes 
such as delayed psychosocial development (Dmitrieva et al., 2012; Mulvey and Schubert, 2012a) 
and school dropout (Snyder, 2004). Void of the necessary education and skills to successfully 
integrate into conventional society, many youth released from custody facilities are at high risk 
to reoffend (Moore, 1996; Blomberg, Bales, Mann, Piquero, and Berk, 2011).  
If the institutional placement of juveniles is not producing a reduction in offending 
through either a rehabilitation or specific deterrent effect, this is clearly an important 
consideration in a cost-benefit calculus of allocating resources. The current study considers the 
much less examined hypothesis which could tilt this cost-benefit consideration even further—
that institutional placement might actually encourage offending by serving as a ‘school of 
crime’. That is, correctional environments can facilitate the accumulation of “criminal capital” 
(e.g., Miller and Ohlin, 1985; Bayer, Hjalmarsson and Pozen, 2009; Dishion and Dodge, 2005; 
Dishion, McCord and Poulin, 1999), which can be defined as the stock of knowledge and skills 
that can facilitate the returns to crime (McCarthy and Hagan, 1995). Thus, in addition to 
fostering greater recidivism and hindering psychosocial development, institutionalizing 
adolescents could create more criminally competent offenders, which can have an important and 
prolonged impact on criminal career development. For example, the rational choice literature in 
criminology suggests that offenders are highly sensitive to rewards, which are especially salient 
in adolescence and in disadvantaged communities (Anderson, 1999; Fagan and Freeman, 1999). 
Similarly, life course and developmental scholars find that offenders who receive greater returns 
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to crime are much less likely to desist from offending (Laub and Sampson, 2003; Pezzin, 1999; 
Piliavin et al., 1986; Shover and Thompson, 1992).  
The substantial cost of incarcerating offenders and the unintended consequences of 
confinement have been well established in the criminological, economics, and prevention science 
literatures (Clear, 2007; Cohen and Piquero, 2009). In the current study, we examine if 
institutional placement fosters greater criminal capital and thus creates more criminally-
competent offenders. However, unlike prior studies which focus on recidivism as an outcome, 
we use unique panel data from a sample of serious juvenile offenders for whom we observe 
reported illegal earnings to study monetary returns to illegal activity after placement. Similar to 
legal labor market studies which use measured earnings—rather than simply if an individual is 
employed or not—to study the returns to education (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Card, 1995, 
1999; Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2011), the use of illegal earnings provides us with a 
proxy to measure offender ‘success’ in the illegal labor market after placement. This affords an 
opportunity to directly address the notion that institutions are crime schools by modeling our 
outcome as the returns to accumulated criminal capital. In so doing, this study departs from 
alternative theoretical explanations designed to explain why some offenders re-offend when 
released from an institution but instead addresses why some offenders do better at crime. 
The paper proceeds as follows: First, we review the extant literature which argues that 
institutional placement fosters criminal capital. Second, we present several theoretical reasons 
why recidivism is only one proxy to measure criminal capital, and it may not be the ideal one. 
Third, we discuss the issue of selection bias in correctional research and present our 
identification strategy. Fourth, we present results which imply a positive yet marginally 
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diminishing facility effect to illegal returns. Finally, we discuss our findings in light of their 
policy and theoretical implications. 
INSTITUTIONS AS “SCHOOLS OF CRIME” 
 There are several ways that being placed in an institution can increase the returns to 
crime. The most notable way is through the accumulation of criminal capital. Criminal capital 
can be conceptualized as the criminal form of the widely influential concept of human capital, 
defined as “activities that influence future real income through embedded resources in people” 
(Becker, 1962: 9).2 The accumulation of criminal capital can stem from a variety of informal 
sources. Sutherland (1947) is most notable for his statement regarding this process. He notes that 
“learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups…the learning includes (a) 
techniques of committing the crime, which are sometimes very complicated, sometimes very 
simple; (b) the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes” (p.9). The 
importance of criminal embeddedness and criminal capital has also been recognized in other 
criminological literature.3 A number of ethnographic works illustrate the process of gaining skills 
and information in successful criminal endeavors (e.g., Shaw, 1931; Sullivan, 1989; Sutherland, 
1937; Steffensmeier and Ulmer, 2005; Padilla, 1992). Cloward and Ohlin (1960:147) for 
example note that “motivations and pressures toward deviance do not fully account for deviant 
behavior any more than motivation and pressures toward conformity account for conforming 
behavior. The individual must have access to a learning environment and, once having been 
                                                           
2 Quantifying the monetary returns associated with the accumulation of human capital (e.g., the returns to education) 
is a widely studied problem in empirical economics (e.g., Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil, 2011).  
3 The idea that formal control institutions can be “schools for crime” has a long history both in criminology and 
literature. In Victorian England, Dickens wrote extensively about the malignant consequences of bridewells, 
workhouses, and debtors prisons (Richardson, 2012). At about the same time, the journalist and neophyte social 
researcher Henry Mayhew conducted comprehensive examinations of both the London poor (most of whom had 
been touched by workhouses or prisons), and London prisons. His books London Labor and the London Poor 
(2012) and The Criminal Prisons of London (2011) document the fact that Victorian institutions for the poor and 
criminal were more successful in teaching crime and vice than they were at reforming. A similar theme was picked 
up by the life histories of Chicago School theorists, as detailed in Shaw’s The Jack Roller (1966).  
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trained, must be allowed to perform his role”. Scholars have examined the role of personal 
intimate groups in fostering criminal capital in the contexts of families (Hagan, 1996), gangs 
(Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000); deviant peers (Dishion et al., 1999; McCarthy and Hagan, 1995) 
and within correctional facilities (Bayer et al., 2007; Ouss, 2011).  
To our knowledge, only a few studies have directly addressed the idea that being 
incarcerated generates criminal capital. Most rigorously, Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and Pozen (2009) 
explicitly hypothesize that an individual can build criminal capital while incarcerated. Using a 
sample of juvenile offenders from Florida, Bayer et al. found strong institutional peer effects in 
that increased exposure to peers with a history of a specific crime type increases the likelihood 
that the subject (who has already committed that crime type) will commit that particular crime 
type upon release. Bayer et al. (2009) showed that institutional contexts can foster criminal 
embeddedness in social relations with like-minded and like-skilled offenders and enhance 
learning of crime skills, thereby resulting in more prolific offending. Bayer and colleagues 
(2009) speculate that one of the mechanisms underlying observed peer effects is that “peers may 
increase knowledge about specific crimes, thereby increasing returns to committing those 
crimes” (p. 136). The authors however, were not able to test this conjecture and only measured 
recidivism as the outcome. Ouss (2011) tested how interactions among prison cell-mates 
influenced recidivism post release among federal prisoners in France. Ouss hypothesized that if 
prisons are truly “schools of crime” and there is a transfer of knowledge, crimes that require 
more skill (i.e., drug dealing and theft) would be more influenced by peers compared to less 
skill-intensive crimes (i.e., drinking and driving). Results showed that indeed, theft and drug 
dealing have the largest peer effect, whereas there were no peer effects for driving under the 
influence and assault. Thus, individuals who had prior experience with theft or drug dealing and 
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spent time with cellmates who also committed theft and/or drug dealing were more likely to 
commit those crimes upon release.4  
Recently, Hutcherson (2012) used the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to look at 
the role of incarceration on illegal earnings and found that individuals who had prior 
incarceration made greater annual illegal earnings compared to individuals who have never been 
incarcerated. Hutcherson speculated that incarceration provides opportunities for individuals to 
gain criminal social capital and knowledge from skilled offenders, which translates to greater 
annual illegal earnings.  In general, these findings lend support to the hypothesis that correctional 
institutions can serve as schools of crime.  However, further empirical attention should be given 
to the relationship between institutions and illegal earnings for several reasons. First, the primary 
dependant variable, annual illegal income, may be a proxy for frequency of offending, which is 
not accounted for in the models. Second, Hutcherson’s analyses only looked at whether an 
individual spent time in jail/prison or not. Finally, zero earners were included in the analysis 
using a tobit model, which essentially treats the zeros as a corner solution outcome. This is 
inconsistent with most research on wage equations, which typically tend to include only those 
individuals earning some wages and treat non-market participants as a problem of sample 
selection (see Bushway et al., 2007; Heckman 1974).   
 Studies in the prevention science literature also show that group interventions can have 
unintended effects. Dishion, McCord, and Poulin (1999) use the term “deviancy training” to 
define the “process of contingent positive reactions to rule-breaking discussions” (p.756). They 
examined group intervention programs in the Adolescent Transitions Program Study and found 
                                                           
4 It is important to note that some scholars, such as Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argue that there is no skill 
required for the commission of most crimes. At the same time, qualitative work in criminology, especially in 
burglary (Wright and Decker, 1994), drug dealing (Jacobs, 1996), and violent offending (Topalli, 2005) suggests 
that offenders do possess specialized knowledge with regard to the successful commission of crimes, target 
selection, and detection avoidance. 
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that aggregating youth with conduct problems resulted in negative outcomes such as an increase 
in tobacco use and antisocial behavior (see also Felman and Caplinger, 1977; Feldman et al., 
1983; Leve and Chamberlain, 2005; Poulin et al., 2001). There is also an indication that 
interventions that cluster antisocial adolescents have long term negative outcomes. The 
Cambridge-Summerville Youth Evaluation Study randomly assigned matched pairs of high risk 
children to treatment and control groups (McCord, 1978; 1981). Adolescents assigned to the 
treatment groups were encouraged to participate in group activities such as sporting events and 
summer camps. Researchers found that by the time the participants reached 35 years old, men 
who were in the treatment group were more likely to die prior to age 35, be convicted of a 
serious crime, be an alcoholic, or diagnosed with a psychiatric disorders outcome. In sum, this 
body of research corroborates the criminal capital literature and provides empirical evidence for 
the notion that correctional institutions and interventions can have criminogenic effects. 
  
BEYOND RECIDVISM 
The bulk of the empirical evidence suggests that incarcerating offenders has either null or 
criminogenic effects (Loughran et al., 2009; Spohn and Holleran, 2002; Petersilia, 2003; Gatti, 
Tremblay, and Vitaro, 2009). As such, some scholars have applied criminal capital theory to 
explain why some offenders accumulate criminal skills and knowledge during their incarceration 
and thus positively contribute to their reoffending after their release. At the same time however, 
concluding that correctional facilities can foster criminal capital may be premature for number of 
theoretical reasons.   
First, using recidivism as a proxy for criminal capital confounds the criminal capital 
effect with several other theoretical explanations which also predict that incarceration would 
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increase the likelihood of reoffending upon release. For example, it has been suggested that 
institutionalization severs important social bonds to the labor market, family, and other 
conventional institutions (Western, 2006; Pager, 2007; Manza and Uggen, 2006). Sampson and 
Laub (1993) note that prison prevents offenders from “knifing off” or dissolving ties to criminal 
opportunities. Labeling theorists posit that incarceration serves to isolate, and stigmatize 
individuals engaged in criminal behavior (Lofland, 1969). Individuals subject to isolation and 
rejection are hypothesized to then internalize the offender label and continue in a life of crime 
(Becker, 1963; Lemert, 1973). Moreover, offenders encounter obstacles that prevent them from 
participating in conventional society in a process called state dependence, which states that 
constraints, preferences, or costs that govern future outcomes are altered by past events (Nagin 
and Paternoster, 1991). Finally, strain theorists argue that imprisonment creates negative 
emotional states such as anger and negative emotionality. Upon release, offenders are deprived 
of adaptive coping mechanisms and often resort to crime to alleviate the pains of reintegration 
(Agnew, 2002; Listwan et al., 2013). In sum, while each of these explanations highlight different 
mechanisms, they all make the same prediction that incarceration leads to recidivism, making it 
difficult to disentangle a criminal capital effect from other mechanisms of persistence.   
Second, studies that have looked at the accumulation of criminal capital in institutions 
have measured recidivism by contact with the criminal justice system. For example, Bayer et al. 
(2009) measured recidivism as subsequent reconviction within one year of release and Ouss 
(2011) measured recidivism as the reappearance in the public defender’s caseload. Accumulation 
of criminal capital however, can also include knowledge and skills that help in avoiding 
detection. In his 1941 commentary on crime prevention, O.W. Wilson noted: “for [some] prison 
proved to be a finishing school of crime from which they graduated and consequently are so 
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adept in their improved techniques to successfully avoid future apprehension” (p.33). More 
recently, Kazemian and LeBlanc (2007) looked at a sample of adjudicated males from Montreal 
Quebec and found that there was variation in individuals’ ability to avoid detection. Morselli et 
al. (2006) observed that offenders who had criminal mentors spent on average nine days less in 
prison. Bouchard and Nguyen (2009) found that adolescents embedded in large adult networks 
were more likely to avoid arrest. They hypothesized that adolescents who are embedded in 
criminal networks containing a large number of adults may be privy to tutelage relationships. 
Thus, it may be that contact with the criminal justice system subsequent to institutionalization is 
a proxy for being an inept criminal. 
 Fortunately, theoretical work concerned with criminal capital provides predictions 
beyond reoffending. McCarthy and Hagan (1995: 89-90) noted the limitations of relying on the 
frequency of criminal activity as an outcome of criminal capital. They wrote: 
Our measures of frequency of criminal activity are to some extent proxies of 
criminal success. That is, although continuation of criminal activity does not 
always denote prosperity in it ... success can be measured more directly. 
Measurement of financial returns and profits obtained are an important possibility. 
Other indicators may include the ability to avoid detection or apprehension, career 
duration, specialization, and prestige within criminal hierarchies. 
 
Unlike other theoretical explanations that predict offending, a theory of criminal capital would 
predict greater success in offending. Therefore, given the difficulty of disentangling the crime 
school effect from other mechanisms that would predict reoffending, criminal earnings can serve 
as another equally important indicator of criminal capital accumulation.  
Finally, it is likely that the positive effects of institutional placement on the returns to 
crime can stem from sources in addition to criminal capital. Signaling theory, which has been 
formalized in labor economics, suggests that in the face of asymmetric or incomplete 
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information, employers rely on indicators or “signals” regarding an individual’s potential 
productivity (Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973). Signaling theory makes similar predictions that 
human capital theory would—i.e., that wages should increase with education (Arrow, 1973).5 
While human capital theory focuses on the role of education in producing skills and higher 
productivity, signaling theory focuses on education as a screening device or filter used by 
employers to sort individuals of differing abilities and identify individuals who are the most 
valuable. Unlike human capital theory however, the signaling perspective has seldom been used 
in criminological discourse.6 One exception is Gambetta (2009) who used signaling theory to 
explain how mafia members establish trust and navigate their way through the underworld. 
According to Gambetta, prison sends a signal to the illegal labor market that the individual is 
experienced and has made a costly investment in the criminal lifestyle, which makes him/her a 
more attractive and trustworthy co-offender: “just being a prisoner is a clear and simple sign that 
one is criminally inclined” (p.11).  
In addition to the fostering of criminal skills or conveying a signal to the illegal labor 
market about one’s criminal inclination, institutionalization can offer individuals opportunities to 
form weak ties, which can give offenders an advantage in the illegal market. Weak ties are 
relationships that are characterized by infrequent contact, an absence of emotional closeness, and 
no history of reciprocal favors. Granovetter (1973) forwarded the idea of the “strength of weak 
ties”, which suggests that ties that require little time investment and energy can be a more fecund 
                                                           
5 Though they both acknowledge the value of education in the labor market, it is important to note that human 
capital theory and the signaling perspective offer very different theoretical explanations on the causal mechanisms at 
work, and in fact yield different predictions. For instance, out of signaling models falls the idea that education has 
negative externalities, which we believe is vitally prescient in the crime school analog. We return to this idea in the 
discussion.  
6 There have been recent applications of signaling theory in prisoner reentry. A special issue of Criminology and 
Public Policy (2012) was dedicated to applying signaling theory to predicting future offending among released 
prisoners. Bushway and Apel (2012) provided an alternative view of the utility of work programs in the prisoner re-
entry process.   
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source of information and opportunity than stronger social ties. In terms of looking for a job or 
gaining important information, it is the weak ties in a person’s local network that provides an 
important source of information and opportunity. Similarly, Burt (1992) highlighted the 
importance of brokerage positions across structural holes. Brokers are individuals who connect 
groups of individuals who otherwise would not be connected. As such, individuals in brokerage 
positions are a valuable source of social capital and have been associated with higher wages and 
promotions (Burt, 2002; see also Lin, 2001). Several studies have also found that weak ties play 
a beneficial role in an offender’s instrumental returns. Tillman and Indergaard (1999) found that 
white-collar criminals who were in brokerage positions used their positions to defraud the health 
insurance industry. Guided by Burt’s structural holes theory, Morselli and Tremblay (2004) 
surveyed a Quebec inmate population about their network of contacts and monthly income from 
criminal activities prior to incarceration. They found that offenders with greater amounts of non-
redundant contacts in their network had more opportunities which led to greater criminal 
earnings. These findings suggest that certain relationships that are not necessarily part of an 
individual’s intimate social group and certain structural positions in a person’s network can have 
an important and positive effect on an offender’s illegal wages. 
 In sum, scholars have long noted that institutional placement can foster criminal capital. 
Yet, empirical inquiry into the “criminal capital effect” has been scant. The few studies that do 
place criminal capital as a key subject of empirical inquiry find support for the notion that 
offenders do accumulate criminal capital when institutionalized. However, extant studies use 
recidivism as the key outcome, which can be somewhat problematic. In addition to fostering 
criminal capital, there may be other reasons why incarceration can contribute to greater illegal 
wages. The signaling perspective and social capital theory also offer insight into this process. To 
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be sure, these explanations are not mutually exclusive and in fact can be complementary in 
explaining variations in legal and illegal wages. However, they do emphasize different aspects of 
the relationship between incarceration and illegal wages.  
IDENTIFICATION IN THE FACE OF SELECTION BIAS 
The dominant methodological hurdle to identifying the effect of institutional placement 
on subsequent outcomes—regardless of which outcome—is the problem of selection bias. 
Ideally, the treatment effect of placement would be determined by comparing the effect of 
institutionalization for a given juvenile with the outcome for that same individual had they not 
been institutionalized. Unfortunately, we can only observe one of these counterfactual 
outcomes—the fundamental problem of causal inference. Instead, what researchers must do is to 
compare those institutionalized with different individuals not institutionalized with full 
knowledge that individuals who are selected, i.e., individuals who select into placement, or 
longer spells of placement, likely are very different in important and preexisting ways from those 
who do not. Therefore, the issue of finding the appropriate counterfactual becomes of primary 
importance.  
The inherent problem of selection in the corrections/recidivism literature has been dealt 
with in several ways. Perhaps the most common strategy in criminology is to estimate a 
regression-based model with a cluster of explanatory or control variables and make a selection-
on-observables assumption, or in other words assume that all of observed covariates are capable 
of explaining differences in treatment assignment. This assumption is commonly manifested in 
the use of propensity score methods to compare placement (i.e., treated) cases to probation (i.e., 
control) cases. For instance, Loughran et al. (2009) were able to rule out 66 covariates, over a 
broad range of categories, as confounders before identifying an essentially null effect of 
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placement on recidivism among a sample of serious juvenile offenders. Similarly, in a study of 
Dutch adults Snodgrass et al. (2011) found a similarly flat dose-response relationship after 
eliminating criminal history and crime type as potential confounders. Some scholars have 
employed propensity score matching within trajectory groups, which attempts to create even 
greater balance between treatment and control groups (e.g., Haviland and Nagin, 2005; 
Nieuwbeerta, Nagin and Blokland, 2009). However, the selection-on-observable assumption can 
quickly become less tenable—and often heroic—if the number of observed covariates is small 
and/or does not include important potential confounders. It is also important to note that in the 
case where there are unobserved confounders, propensity score methods are ineffective at 
solving the selection problem. Manski and Nagin (1998), under much weaker assumptions, 
derive bounds, instead of point estimates, for the effect of institutional placement on recidivism 
among a sample of juvenile offenders from Utah. However, under such weak assumptions, these 
bounds yield an ambiguous conclusion as only under stronger assumptions about the nature of 
judges’ sentencing strategy were Manski and Nagin able to identify the algebraic sign of the 
point estimate.   
 A second strategy used to deal with the inherent selection problem is the instrumental 
variable approach. Berube and Green (2007) and Green and Winik (2010) all used similar 
instruments to achieve exogenous variation: they take advantage of the fact that, in some 
jurisdictions, defendants are assigned randomly to judges who vary in sentencing tendencies. 
This sets the stage for a test of whether exogenous variation in sentencing affects rates of 
recidivism. Results generally suggest that there is little relationship between sentence length and 
recidivism. Turner (2009) and Abrams (2011) use data from Clark County, Nevada and random 
assignment to attorney and heterogeneity in attorney skill as an instrument for sentence length. 
[16] 
 
Turner’s findings corroborate those of others who use the instrumental variables approach: there 
is little relationship between sentence length and recidivism. Abrams (2011) found 
heterogeneous effects of sentence length on recidivism. He found that individuals sentenced to 
short-periods (0 to 2 months) were more likely to recidivate and suggested that 
institutionalization could, in fact, benefit novice criminals because criminals learn about new 
techniques and information useful in avoiding apprehension.7 The instrumental variables 
approach is a creative strategy that produces consistent estimates in the presence of omitted 
variables. However, the utility of this approach rests heavily on the instrument itself. If the 
instrument is invalid or weak this would result in large standard errors, and not be much of an 
improvement over the standard ordinary least squares estimator. As such, in some cases the 
instrumental variables approach can cause more problems than they solve (see Bound, Jaeger, 
and Baker, 1995). 
The availability of panel data provides yet another way to deal with selection. It is 
possible and quite likely that selection bias plaguing identification of a placement effect results 
from fixed unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, in legal labor market studies, economists 
often refer to unobserved ‘ability’ or ‘motivation’ as being an important determinant in an 
earnings equation. Any positive correlation between entry into the market and productivity 
indicators can be attributed to selection rather than causality, which is a form of omitted variable 
bias (Wooldridge, 2009). In the present case, there are several unobservable variables that likely 
strongly influence illegal earnings. Factors such as criminal propensity, ability, intelligence and 
motivation are difficult to quantify and may not necessarily have reasonable proxies. 
                                                           
7 Other methods based on exogenous variation have been used to confront the selection problem, such as 
experiments (Berecochea and Jaman, 1981; Gaes and Camp, 2009), regression discontinuity approaches (Chen and 




Criminologists have speculated about the role of criminal ability (Morselli and Tremblay, 2004; 
Steffensmeier and Ulmer, 2005; Wright and Decker, 1994), which if correlated with both the 
wage offer and factors leading to higher likelihood of placement can, if ignored, result in 
important misspecification of the model.   
 To address issues of unobserved heterogeneity, we rely on a unique sample of serious 
adolescent felony offenders who have provided detailed information about their experiences in 
incarceration and their illegal income over a seven year period. Panel data offer a way to 
ameliorate the problem of omitted variable bias by eliminating fixed unobservable heterogeneity 
via estimation using individual fixed effects. The main strength of using this estimator to identify 
the impact of the ‘crime school’ effect on illegal wages is that our two central variables, length of 
incarceration and peer exposure in facilities, are as good as randomly assigned conditional that 
the unobserved heterogeneity is fixed (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). If this assumption is met, then 
the fixed effects estimator yields consistent parameter estimates. To the best of our knowledge, 
this research question, methodological approach, and longitudinal nature of the data we employ 
have not been considered in previous research. 
CURRENT STUDY 
Given the implications for using recidivism as a proxy for criminal capital, we address 
the notion that prisons are schools of crime by identifying the criminal capital effect through an 
important measure of criminal achievement—illegal wages. To this end, we provide important 
contributions to the extant research in a number ways. First, we are able to identify the criminal 
capital effect by using detailed information on within individual change in the illegal wage rate 
and information regarding institutional stays over a seven year period. Second, we have a 
measure of the prevalence of friends in the facility who engage in four income-generating 
[18] 
 
behaviors. Criminal capital theory underscores the importance of the transmission of specialized 
skills and knowledge (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; McCarthy and Hagan, 2001; Sutherland, 1947). 
We, therefore, expect that exposure to peers who engage in income generating crimes will foster 
greater criminal capital. Our measure of peer exposure is specific to institutional peers and 
allows each individual his/her own peer exposure.   
In addition to peer exposure, we measure the length of institutional stays as a cumulative 
dosage. This provides us with two separate measures that tap into the different mechanisms by 
which offenders can acquire criminal capital within institutions. Guided by the literature on the 
effects of institutionalization and criminal capital, we hypothesize that spending more time 
institutionalized and having greater exposure to deviant peers within the facilities will generate 
greater criminal capital, measured by a significant positive effect on one’s illegal wage rate. Our 
study is among the few to consider the notion that institutions are schools of crime and the only 
one to do so in a longitudinal manner. To this end, we believe that our findings will be highly 
relevant for both theory and policy. 
DATA  
The current study uses a subset of N=352 individuals enrolled in the Pathways to 
Desistance study, a longitudinal investigation of the transition from adolescence to young 
adulthood in a sample of serious adolescent offenders. Study participants are adolescents who 
were found guilty of a serious offense (almost entirely felony offenses) in the juvenile or adult 
court systems in Maricopa County, AZ or Philadelphia County, PA during the recruitment period 
(November, 2000 through January, 2003). Participants were ages 14 to 17 at the time of their 
enrollment into the study (M = 16.5), and data were collected at ten consecutive follow-up 
interviews. The first six interviews correspond to six-month observational periods over 36 
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months and the remaining interviews are twelve-month observational periods. Information 
regarding the rationale and overall design of the study can be found in Mulvey et al. (2004), 
while details regarding recruitment, a description of the full sample, and the study methodology 
are discussed in Schubert et al. (2004).8   
The present analysis consider N=352 individuals who report illegal earnings in at least 
two observational periods to allow us to construct a longitudinal illegal earnings profile.9 The 
study sample, like the overall sample, is comprised mainly of non-white (45% African American, 
27% Hispanic) males (93%). In each period, we observe for each individual their total reported 
illegal earnings, the number of days spent in one of five types of institutions10, the number of 
peers in the institutions that committed income-generating crimes, along with their age, income-
generating crimes variety proportion (described below), their criminal experience, and their 
criminal embeddedness. Information regarding the total amount of money earned from illegal 
activity each month was recorded by using a life-event calendar. This information was 
aggregated to provide earnings information for each of the follow-up periods. Methods for 
constructing life-event calendars have been shown to be reliable in studies of criminal offending, 
antisocial behavior, and mental health service use (Caspi et al., 1996; Horney, Osgood, and 
Marshall, 1995; Morris and Slocum, 2010; Roberts and Horney, 2010).  
 
Outcome variable 
                                                           
8 Additional information about the study can be found at: www.pathwaysstudy.pitt.edu. 
9 A total of N=1,354 adolescents are included in the study, representing approximately one in three adolescents 
adjudicated on the enumerated charges in each locale during the recruitment period. Yet, not every individual 
reported involvement in illegal income-generating activity in all periods. Out of 1,354 participants, 615 unique 
individuals report illegal earnings at some point over the entire study period. Among these individuals, 263 subjects 
reported illegal wages for only one recall period. Therefore, 352 subjects have at least two recall periods in which 
they report illegal earnings, and hence are able to be included in this analysis. We consider the important 
implications of this sample selection issue in more detail below in both the methods and discussion sections.      




Daily illegal wages: We use the daily illegal wage rate (instead of aggregate earnings 
over an observation period) to account for the different amounts of time individuals are on the 
street, and thus capable of generating illegal earnings, during any given observation period. Daily 
illegal wage rate was calculated by dividing the total self-reported illegal earnings for a recall 
period by the number of days the subject spent in the community. The number of days the 
subject spent in the community was calculated by multiplying the total number of days in the 
recall period by the proportion of time the subject did not spend in an institution. The mean daily 
illegal wage rate is $205.04; however due to the skewness, which is common with self-reported 
earnings data, we applied a natural logarithmic transformation to create our dependent variable. 
Figure 1 shows that the log daily illegal wage rate has a mean of 3.75 and a standard deviation of 
1.83.11 
~ Figure 1 about here ~ 
Independent variable 
We operationalize facility exposure in two unique ways: cumulative number of days in 
custody and maximum peer exposure within the facility.  
Number of days in custody: To determine the relationship between the length of stay in 
custody and the illegal wage rate, we summed the total number of days that an individual spent 
in custody across the five facilities. The average total number of days an individual was in 
custody is 65.08 (including zeros) over a six month observation period. The total number of days 
was summed to create a cumulative score of the number of days institutionalized over the course 
of the seven-year follow-up. 
                                                           
11 Past results find similar illegal wage rates. For example, Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) found that the average 
monthly wage for low level dealers is $140-200, whereas individuals in higher positions earned considerably more. 
McCarthy and Hagan (2001) found that the average daily wages for homeless youth engaged in drug dealing was 
$101. Freeman (1996) found that among a sample of Boston youth, occasional offenders earned $250 and weekly 
offenders earned $448.  
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Facility peer exposure: Individuals were asked “While you were at facility x, of the 
friends you had there, how many have ever done the following things? We are interested in 
lifetime behavior, not just behavior within the institution or program”. Subjects chose an answer 
on a Likert scale (1=none; 2=few; 3=some; 4=most; 5=all). There were a total of 12 items 
ranging from destroying property to entering a building to steal.12 We constructed an economic 
scale using the four income-generating crimes (sold drugs, stealing something worth more than 
$100, stole a car, and enter a building to steal). Because individuals often spent time at more than 
one facility during one observation period, and subjects chose answers from a Likert scale for 
each peer delinquency measure, this created a measurement challenge. We originally constructed 
a weighted average score of peer delinquency by institutional stay to create one Likert scale for 
each observation period. This scale was then summed to create a cumulative index of facility 
peer exposure over the seven year follow-up period, similar to our total number of days 
incarcerated measure. However, the two cumulative measures were highly correlated and could 
not be entered in the same model. Therefore, we retained the maximum rating of institutional 
peer delinquency that an individual reported prior to his/her reported illegal wages. Thus, facility 
peer exposure is operationalized as: 0=no facility stays; 1=none; 2=few; 3=some; 4=most; 5=all 
across the four income-generating crimes.13 
Control variables 
Criminal experience: Past research has shown that criminal experience is positively 
related to total illegal earnings (Uggen and Thompson, 2003). Criminal experience is the sum of 
                                                           
12 The 12 items include: destroy property, hit someone, sold drugs, consumed alcohol, carry a knife, carry a gun, 
owned a gun, fight, hurt someone in a fight, stole something worth more than $100, stole a car, enter a building to 
steal. 
13 There were 117 out of 1117 missing values for peer ratings among individuals who reported being in a facility. 
Among the 117 we imputed the mean rating that the individual reported across all their stays. To ensure that 
imputation did not change the results, we also ran the model without the imputed values (1000 observations). 
Results were almost identical. 
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the frequencies reported across 11 income offenses.14 We use these frequencies to calculate 
criminal experience by creating a cumulative count. According to human capital theory, 
experience should be positively related to earnings at a marginally decreasing rate (Mincer, 
1978). As such, we include a squared term.  
Adult facility: Adult facilities differ from juvenile facilities in important ways. Juvenile 
facilities have to goal of interrupting the juvenile’s offending cycle and are rehabilitation focused 
and therefore provide more programs and services compared to the retributive adult system 
(Bishop and Frazier, 2000; Zimring, 2005). Therefore, experiences in juvenile facilities and adult 
facilities can be very different. (Mulvey and Schubert, 2012b). We therefore include a binary 
measure to indicate whether the subject spent time in an adult facility during the recall period.  
There were 561 unique stays across 252 individuals who spent time at an adult facility.  
Age: Because age is related to both criminal experience and earnings potential, we 
control for age of the participant. Table 1 shows that the average age across the ten observational 
periods is 19.71 years.15  
Criminal embeddedness: As embeddedness in deviant networks has been shown to be an 
important predictor of greater criminal earnings (Morselli et al., 2006; Uggen and Thompson, 
2003), we constructed measures of criminal embeddedness using the peer delinquent behavior 
items, which are a subset of those used by the Rochester Youth Study (Thornberry et al., 1994) 
to assess the degree of antisocial activity among the adolescent's peers. At each recall period, 
subjects were asked how many of their friends have done the particular behavior.  Subjects chose 
an answer on a Likert scale (1=none; 2=few; 3=some; 4=most; 5=all). There were a total of 10 
                                                           
14 The 11 items include: shoplifted, bought/received/sold stolen property, used checks/credit cards illegally, stolen 
car/motorcycle, sold marijuana, sold other drugs, stole something worth more than $100, enter a building to steal, 
took something by force using weapon, took something by force no weapon, and prostitution. 
15 Due to the irregularity of periods in which individuals report illegal earnings, since incarceration leaves large gaps 
in the panel, we are able to observe meaningful variation in the change in age.   
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items ranging from destroying property to entering a building to steal. Similar to the facility peer 
exposure, we limited our measure of criminal embeddedness to income-generating crimes.16 
Income offending proportion: Previous studies on illegal earnings have found that 
offending specialization increases illegal earnings (McCarthy and Hagan, 2001). We therefore 
included a proportion in which the numerator is the number of income offenses which were 
committed in the recall period and the denominator is the items which are considered income- 
generating. These are a total of 10 potential self-reported crimes that are considered income-
generating: shoplifted, bought/received/sold stolen property, used checks/credit cards illegally, 
stolen car/motorcycle, sold marijuana, sold other drugs, stole something worth more than $100, 
enter a building to steal, took something by force using weapon, and took something by force no 
weapon. The average proportion of income offending is 0.13, across the full 10 interview 
periods, which indicates that most participants do not engage in a wide variety of income-
generating crimes.  
~Table 1 about here~ 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 We can specify the illegal wage function as follows: 
 
Where logwageit represents the natural log of the rate of daily illegal wages for individual i at 
time t. Let Fit be a vector which includes the cumulative number of days an individual has spent 
in a secure facility at time t and its square, and let  be an indicator regarding the level of 
                                                           
16 Haynie and Osgood (2005) have noted one limitation of self-reported peer measures is that they may overestimate 
the true influence of peers. While we recognize this possibility, we offer two points as to why this potential problem 
would be less problematic for our findings. First, our estimator is based on identification solely from within person 
variability. Thus, identification is derived from any changes in level of reported peer influence, as opposed to 
absolute levels, and any fixed reporting bias on the part of the individual would be differenced away. Second, and 
more importantly, even if the peer effect is upwardly biased, this would not explain the independent days effect we 
observe, and in fact would only make the gap between these two effect sizes larger, therefore calling even more 
emphasis to a secondary mechanism beyond a ‘crime school’ peers explanation.  
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exposure to the peers in the facility at time t. Let Xit be a vector of individual time varying 
variables such as, criminal experience, whether or not the subject spent time at an adult facility, 
age, the level of criminal embeddedness, and the income offending proportion, which we 
hypothesize are contemporaneous measures that also potentially affect criminal returns (Uggen 
and Thompson, 2003). Finally, let  represent fixed unobservable individual-specific 
characteristics which may be affecting wages and correlated with other regressors (e.g., 
motivation or criminal propensity). The key parameters of interest are the vectors β and γ, which 
would correspond to the effects of placement length and peers.  
 To estimate the parameters of this model, we employ typical estimators designed to 
eliminate bias due to fixed unobserved heterogeneity. Yet, as we note above in description of the 
sample, it is likely there are also issues with sample selectivity to consider as well. Namely, 
similar to studies of legal wages, individuals who do not report participation in illegal income-
generating activities in period cannot simply be coded as having zero earnings and included in 
estimation, as their potential wage offer is unobserved (i.e., such observations suffer from 
incidental truncation).17 Simultaneously correcting for unobserved heterogeneity and sample 
selection bias through individual fixed effects presents a very intimidating methodological 
obstacle. Several econometricians have proposed assumption-heavy estimators to tackle this 
issue (Wooldridge 1995; Vella and Verbeek 1999), yet, perhaps in part due to their complexity, 
there are very few empirical applications of these methods even in the labor economics literature 
(see Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina 2007). As such, a formal treatment would require a more 
detailed discussion of the methodological approach and requisite assumptions. Therefore, in the 
                                                           
17 In other words, it is likely that certain individuals could earn money in the illegal market, but for whatever reason 
choose not to participate (e.g., they may view the risk or costs to outweigh the potential rewards). This is analogous 
to a well-developed problem in labor economics which originated in early studies of female labor supply (Gronau, 
1974),    
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present study, we forgo dealing directly with the sample selection issue in favor of concentrating 
on the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. Instead, we note that our results are likely upwardly 
biased estimates of the relationship to the larger population of serious offenders. However, we 
stress that the group to whom our findings are directly generalizable—repeat illegal wage 
earners—is nonetheless a highly important group to study for policy purposes.    
RESULTS 
Our results section consists of two main sets of analyses. First, we consider if there is an 
overall placement effect on illegal earnings, which is analogous to the effect of placement on 
recidivism considered in many other studies. Note that this overall effect does not provide insight 
as to any certain mechanisms. Second, we examine our indicators of facility exposure. To 
determine whether or not overall placement in an institution increases illegal wage rates, we first 
establish that there is variation in illegal wage rates between the first period in which we observe 
a subject’s reported illegal wages and the second period in which we observe the same subject’s 
illegal wages. Figure 2 illustrates that this is the case: some participants increase their wage rates 
whereas others decrease their wage rates. We also examine the distribution of the illegal wage 
rate conditional on our main predictors.  
~ Figure 2 about here ~ 
Table 2 shows the quintiles of the cumulative number of days incarcerated and that the 
average of the illegal wage rate for each respective quintile increases, except for at the 80th 
percentile.  Similarly, facility peer exposure was also broken down into the six categories and 
shows a generally positive relationship with illegal wage rate. 
~ Table 2 about here ~ 
OVERALL PLACEMENT EFFECT—FIRST-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS 
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To further explore whether being placed in an institution is related to a change in one’s 
illegal wage rate, we compare the first and second observations of log illegal daily wages for 
individuals who were placed in a facility between the two observations and for individuals who 
did not spend any time in a facility. Figure 3 illustrates two important points that inform our 
subsequent analyses. First, on average individuals who were placed in a facility (n=259) 
increased their illegal wage rate whereas those who were not placed did not (n=93), which 
prompts us to move forward with investigating facility effects. More specifically, the difference 
between subjects who were not placed in a facility between time 1 and time 2 is -0.031 log 
dollars (p=0.909) whereas the subjects who were placed in a facility between time 1 and time 2 is 
much larger: .342 log dollars (p=0.033). The difference-in-difference between those who were 
placed and those who were not placed is 0.373 log dollars (p<0.001), suggesting there is an 
important overall facility effect. Second, Figure 3 illustrates that individuals who are placed in a 
facility tend to have higher illegal wages to start with. A difference of means test comparing 
subjects who were not placed in a facility and subjects who were placed at time 1 is -.658 log 
dollars (p=0.003). This underscores the notion that there are possible selection effects for 
individuals who are placed in a facility that distinguish them from their counterparts who are not 
placed in facilities and can also contribute to variation in illegal wage rates.  
~ Figure 3 about here ~ 
To assess the relationship between all our measures, we use an identification strategy 
based on a first-difference estimate, which employs essentially the same logic as the fixed effects 
estimator but with two time points.18 Table 3 displays the results of our first difference model, 
                                                           
18 As compared to a fixed-effects, or within-person, estimator which time-demeans each observation for every 
individual, the first difference estimator considers the change in each variable from time t to time t+1. Importantly, 
both estimators have the important feature that differences away bias due to fixed unobserved heterogeneity, and in 
the case of two periods, they are mathematically equivalent.  
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conducted in five stages. Column 1 shows diminishing marginal returns to days incarcerated, 
even when controlling for criminal experience, criminal embeddedness, and variety income 
offending (column 2). Column 3 illustrates that facility peer exposure has a positive and 
significant effect of illegal wage rate. The positive and significant effect of facility peers 
remained when we added our control variables (column 4). Finally, column 5 shows the results 
when we enter both facility predictors and our control variables. Both predictors exert 
independent effects on the illegal wage rate. To be clear, with panel data, the first-difference 
estimates are for the same cross section units. We initially limited our analyses to the first two 
time points for clarity, however 192 out of 352 subjects reported illegal wages at more than two 
time points.  With more than two time points, the fixed effects estimator is a more efficient 
estimator (under the assumption that the errors are not serially correlated; [Wooldridge, 2002]); 
therefore, we estimate our full models using the fixed effects estimator. 
~Table 3 about here~ 
FACILITY EXPOSURE—FIXED EFFECTS 
Similar to the first difference analysis, we enter our facility measures in five separate 
stages. We first estimate the model using standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), with standard 
errors clustered at the individual level, to highlight the degree of bias due to selection that might 
be present. To be clear, any unobserved fixed differences among individuals contributing to 
illegal earnings would not be accounted for in these estimates. The results show that across 
individuals, there are increasing yet diminishing marginal returns to the number of days 
incarcerated across all the models. For every day spent incarcerated, there is an increase in the 
daily wage rate. However, the negative coefficient on the quadratic term implies this relationship 
increases at a decreasing rate, even when accounting for our time varying controls (column 1 and 
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2). Similarly, facility peer exposure significantly increases daily wage rate and this relationship 
holds even after controlling for important time varying covariates (columns 3 and 4). Column 5 
illustrates that both facility measures remain significant when entered in the same model: the 
number of days incarcerated increases the illegal wage rate at a marginally decreasing rate and 
the greater the facility peer exposure, the higher the illegal wage rate.  
~Table 4 about here~ 
The fixed effects results are presented in Table 5. We proceed in the same manner as we 
did for the OLS models and found similar results. First, there are increasing yet diminishing 
marginal returns to the number of days incarcerated across all the columns. The magnitude of the 
effect is slightly smaller in the fixed effects models compared to the OLS model. Second, Table 
5 reveals that the facility peer effect reduces by about one half but retains statistical significance 
even after controlling for other factors. This result suggests that the OLS estimator is upward 
biased, likely due to omitted variables. Similar to the number of days incarcerated, criminal 
experience also increases illegal wage rate at a decreasing rate. When both facility measures are 
simultaneously considered, both the number of days incarcerated and facility peer exposure 
slightly decreases in magnitude yet still remain positive and statistically significant. Community 
peer exposure significantly increases the illegal wage rate whereas age appears to be important 
across individuals but not within persons. The more types of income-generating crimes predict 
increases in an individual’s illegal wage rate but not across individuals. Spending time in an 
adult facility does not have an effect on the illegal wage rate.  In sum, both of our facility 
measures predict an increase in an individual’s illegal wage rate. 
~ Table 5 about here ~ 
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 The magnitudes of the days incarcerated coefficients are difficult to concretely interpret 
in isolation as they are quite small and the unit (days) has a large range. However, they can be 
transformed into marginal effects to better understand the nature of the days incarcerated effect. 
For example, the results from the fully specified model in column 5 indicate that for an 
individual at the first quintile of cumulative days incarcerated, holding all else constant, an 
additional 30 days of incarceration would yield a 2.9% increase in the daily illegal wage rate.19 
For an individual earning the average daily illegal wage rate in the sample, this would translate 
into an additional $172 per month. For an individual at the top quintile of cumulative days 
incarcerated, however, an additional 30 days of incarceration would only yield a 0.9% increase 
in daily wage rate, as this effect is marginally declining. We note, however, that over the entire 
support of the cumulative days range in the data, this marginal effect would be strictly positive.  
 Finally, we note that the magnitude of the facility peer exposure coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant in each of our model specifications. The magnitude of this coefficient 
is dramatically reduced in the fixed effects specification, which is highly indicative of selection. 
Moreover, in the fully specified model which includes both days incarcerated and peer exposure, 
the magnitude of the peer exposure effect is reduced by approximately 40%, which is expected 
since these two variables are strongly positively correlated.20 Yet, even in the fully specified 
model, each increase in peer exposure category is worth about an 11% increase in illegal returns. 
Our findings indicate that there is both a peer exposure effect, which is indicative of a criminal 
capital ‘crime school’ effect, and an additional facility effect. This suggests there are perhaps 
                                                           
19 We evaluated this marginal effect in our log-linear model using the model coefficients to generate the following 
formula: [.001 – 2(5.29E-7)(40)] *30, where 40 is the first quintile of cumulative days incarcerated and 30 is the size 
of the dosage.  
20 Ideally, we would have specified the model as a personXdays dosage and fit the model nonparametrically. 
However, our measure of facility peer exposure was categorical and prevented such a specification.  
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additional mechanisms—signaling, for instance—at work beyond a pure crime school 
explanation.   
DISCUSSION 
 Understanding the unintended consequences of institutionalization has important policy 
and theoretical implications. In the most immediate sense, institutionalization produces heavy 
burdens on the correctional system (as well as the communities from which offenders come from 
and subsequently return to) and has often showed criminogenic effects. In the longer term, 
incarcerating offenders can have consequences that are possibly even more deleterious: 
incarceration can foster opportunities to learn criminal rationalizations, skills, and techniques for 
offending. Given the accumulating evidence within the rational choice and desistance literature 
that shows that offenders are highly sensitive to rewards (Piquero et al., 2011), individuals who 
have greater returns to crime are less likely to enter the desistance process. Although 
underexplored, increasing the rewards from crime has important consequences as it can alter 
criminal trajectories and can be extremely costly both financially and in terms of additional 
crimes and future incarceration.  
In light of the short term and long term consequences of incarceration, the current study 
investigated a relatively neglected line of inquiry. Using a unique sample of serious adolescent 
offenders that have been followed over seven years, we considered whether institutions are 
schools of crime in the sense that they facilitate greater returns to crime. To address some of the 
shortcomings of previous studies that have looked at institutions as a school for ‘crime school’ 
effect, we used two different but complementary predictors of institutional experiences and 
modeled our outcome as an illegal wage rate, which allowed us to isolate the criminal capital 
effect. Several important findings emerged. 
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 First, both our facility measures, total number of days incarcerated and exposure to 
deviant peers, predict a positive increase in an individual’s daily illegal wage rate, even after 
eliminating fixed unobserved heterogeneity and controlling for important time-varying 
confounders such as criminal experience and level of criminal embeddedness. For total number 
of days institutionalized, there were positive though marginally declining returns to length of 
stay. This suggests that there is perhaps a low learning curve to acquiring such criminal capital, 
and short term stays are just as useful to an offender as longer term stays. This finding adds 
further complexity to the task of examining length of institutionalization and future recidivism. 
For example, the relationship between institutional length and recidivism appears to be 
nonlinear. Some scholars have found that shorter terms of institutionalization can lead to higher 
rates of recidivism (Abrams, 2011; Bushway and Owens, 2010). Institutionalization carries with 
it tangible costs such as monitoring, housing and feeding offenders, and intangible costs such as 
loss of freedom and lost pro-social opportunities. To fully consider the costs and benefits of 
incarceration, offenders’ accumulation of criminal capital should be one of the key 
considerations. Our results seem to suggest that, based on capital accumulation and access to 
new social opportunities, for some offenders being incarcerated during a portion of their criminal 
career might actually be rewarding.  
 In addition to the number of days institutionalized, there is a positive relationship 
between the number of friends within facilities who engaged in income-generating crime and 
reported subsequent illegal wages. This finding supports the notion that institutions are schools 
of crime, suggesting that individuals learn definitions, techniques, skills and acquire information 
from peers within the facility. This is in line with the portrayal of the accumulation of a 
conventional form of criminal capital—human capital. More specifically, some sociologists 
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describe education (the formation of skills and knowledge) as a process that requires 
socialization (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985). For example, Coleman (1988) emphasized the 
importance of family members and community members in developing human capital in 
children. Similarly, criminologists have illustrated a process whereby offenders gain knowledge 
and skills from more experienced offenders (e.g., Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Sutherland, 1931). 
In this view, institutions serve as schools of crime because the primary source in formation of 
criminal capital is from direct exposure to peers within the correctional institution. Our results 
harmonize with this view that education is obtained through a process of socialization. More 
specifically, friends within a facility are a salient source of criminal capital, which can help in 
achieving greater monetary rewards from crime. 
Given that our measure reflects the number of friends who had experience with income- 
generating crimes during institutionalization, we are unable to determine the precise mechanisms 
of criminal capital formation. For instance, direct mentoring or tutelage from friends within the 
facility or simply the transference of information both add to criminal capital but can have very 
different outcomes upon release (McCarthy and Hagan, 1995; Morselli et al., 2006).  
Although an individual’s friends during institutionalization have a positive and 
significant effect on the illegal wage rate, it does not fully mediate the positive effects of the 
number of days institutionalized. Both predictors exerted independent effects on an offender’s 
illegal wage rate, suggesting that there are mechanisms beyond the accumulation of criminal 
capital that increases a subject’s illegal wage rate. One theoretical perspective that offers some 
insight into why being incarcerated may increase illegal wage rates is the signaling perspective. 
Even though both human capital theory and the signaling perspective would predict that 
incarceration can increase illegal wage rate, they highlight different processes. A signaling 
[33] 
 
theoretical explanation could indicate to other illegal market participants that, by ‘investing’ time 
in institutions, the individual has made an escalation of commitment to a deviant lifestyle and is 
a capable and committed illegal market operator in the future.      
It is a worthy endeavor to examine the explanatory value of signaling theory in the criminal 
context. For example, criminologists can use signaling theory to show how actions might signal 
particular unobservable attributes and provide benefits to both signaler and observers. There 
have been recent strides to apply signaling theory to prisoner re-entry (e.g., Bushway and Apel, 
2012); however, the signaling perspective is also valuable for understanding the illegal market. 
One basic tenet of the perspective is that individuals look to signals under circumstances of 
uncertainty (Arrow, 1978). For example, employers look for indices of productivity when hiring 
individuals. There are few endeavors that carry the inherent risks and uncertainty as criminal 
behavior. For example, criminal co-operation is a highly risky enterprise as co-offenders can be 
inept or untrustworthy (McCarthy, Hagan and Cohen, 1998). Criminal offending groups are 
often ephemeral and potential co-offenders are often faced with incomplete information 
regarding the trustworthiness and competence of their co-offenders. Thus, failures and mistakes 
can be costly due to the loss of opportunity for fruitful cooperation (Bacharach and Gambetta, 
2001). Moreover, the costs of signaling should be negatively associated with productivity. Costs 
generally incorporate a number of things including psychological costs, monetary costs, or time 
costs (Spence, 1792). Thus, offenders who have been incarcerated can choose to signal to the 
illegal job market that he/she has experience and is committed to the criminal lifestyle.21  
                                                           
21 An alternative behavioral explanation for this finding is the sunk cost fallacy. In other words, some individuals 
may view their time in incarceration as a sunk cost, and the need to justify it by continuing to produce returns to this 
‘investment’ may lead some individuals to irrationally conclude that continuing participation in illegal activities is 
merited. As the present study includes no behavioral intentions to assess this possibility, it remains a speculation in 
need of empirical research.  
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Another potential reason why facility peers did not fully mediate the effects of the total 
number of days incarcerated is that our measure of facility peer exposure was based on questions 
that asked subjects about the criminal behavior of their friends within the correctional facility. It 
is likely that subjects were also exposed to and influenced by other individuals during their 
incarceration whom they did not consider friends. In line with Granovetter’s (1973) strength of 
weak ties argument, not all contacts made in prison are necessarily friendship ties. Offenders are 
exposed to individuals in correctional facilities whom they would not likely encounter in their 
day to day life. These acquaintances can become valuable sources of social capital by providing 
new and novel information about criminal opportunities.  They can also be important bridges 
between different groups of individuals who would otherwise be unconnected.  
We also found non-trivial bias due to selection, even within a sample of relatively serious 
offenders which must be accounted for in studying the effects of incarceration. When comparing 
our OLS model to the fixed effects model, several important differences emerged. Most notably 
our facility measures, total number of days incarcerated and facility peer exposure, were twice as 
large in the OLS model compared to the fixed effect model, suggesting that if selection was not 
accounted for, the estimates would be bias upward. More recently, selection bias has been 
recognized as a pervasive problem in the criminological literature in general and in identifying 
incarceration effects in particular. Although the issue of selection is not always problematic, 
careful consideration of selection bias should be of primary importance.  
Third, it is important to recognize that proximate factors were very important to greater 
illegal wage rates. Guided by human capital theory and previous work on criminal capital, we 
included five time varying covariates in our models. Consistent with prior work, we found that 
there was a nonlinear marginal return to criminal experience (Uggen and Thompson, 2003). 
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Criminal embeddedness also exerted a positive and significant effect on the illegal wage rate, 
suggesting that increases in an offender’s friends within the community are important.  Our 
measure of income offending variety also surfaced as an important positive predictor of within 
individual change in the illegal wage rate. The greater number of income-generating crimes a 
person engages in, the higher his/her illegal wage rate.  On the surface, this is at odds with prior 
studies that have found that individuals who specialize have greater illegal wages (e.g., 
McCarthy and Hagan, 2001). One potential explanation is that our measure was restricted to 
types of crimes within the income-generating crimes category rather than the number of crime 
types across all categories of crime.22  These findings suggest that although experiences within 
correctional facilities have an important impact on an offender’s illegal wage rate, experiences 
and contacts accumulated outside of correctional facilities cannot be overlooked.  
For juveniles, placement in institutions can have important negative consequences. Prior 
to this study, findings from the Pathways Study  have found evidence both that institutional 
placement has a null or perhaps even a criminogenic effect on recidivism and that longer lengths 
of stay yield no marginal deterrent effect (Loughran et al., 2009). Our findings extend and 
complement these findings showing that institutionalization might also serve to increase 
opportunities in the illegal market. In addition to increasing the likelihood of recidivism upon 
release, adolescents are denied the opportunities to build conventional human capital and social 
capital, which has consequences for later opportunities (Mulvey and Schubert, 2012a). Instead, 
correctional facilities provide opportunities for adolescents to develop criminal capital and 
criminal social capital. Except for assessing the efficacy of treatment programs within prisons, 
offender experiences within correctional facilities are rarely studied and prison experiences are 
                                                           
22 McCarthy and Hagan (2001) used engaging in drug crimes only as their measure of specialization. Drug crimes 
are unique and are qualitatively different from other types of crime (Thompson and Uggen, 2012)  
[36] 
 
often referred to as the “black box” (Clear, 1996). However, experiences during incarceration 
can have profound effects on future outcomes, especially during adolescence.  As Clear (1996:1) 
notes, incarceration has “unforeseen effects [that] are subtle and, in some ways, modest, but over 
time they combine to counteract the positive effects of prison. A broader, more complete 
understanding of the effects of incarceration would enable us to understand the limits of using 
prison as a crime-prevention strategy”.  In the current study, we revealed an important and 
unintended consequence of incarceration: the formation of criminal capital. This not only 
undermines prison as a crime-prevention strategy but could also promote longer and more 
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Table 1. Descriptive of sample (n=352). 
 Mean s.d. Median Q1 Q3 
Daily wages 205.04 1087.74 50.88 13.80 144.44 
Log daily wages 3.75 1.83 3.93 2.63 4.97 
Days incarcerated      
waves 1 to 6 65.08 74.64 25 0 137.50 
waves 7 to 10 116.12 141.81 26 0 247.00 
Peer exposure (facility) 3.39 1.01 3.5 3.00 4.00 
Time varying controls:      
Criminal experience (total frequency)     
waves 1 to 6 91.83 296.03 0 0 25.00 
waves 7 to 10 100.31 260.25 0 0 68.00 
Adult facility .387 .487 0 0 1 
Criminal embeddedness 1.85 0.89 1.50 1 2.50 
Age 19.71 2.30 19.40 18.00 21.36 
Income variety offending 0.13 1.80 0.10 0 0.20 




Table 2. Conditional illegal wage rate distributions. 
Cumulative days incarcerated 
(quintiles) 
Days  Log illegal wage rate 
Q1 40.60 3.30 
Q2 199.00 3.85 
Q3 400.00 4.26 
Q4 661.00 4.08 
   
Facility peers n Log illegal wage rate 
0 370 2.90 
1.0-1.49 60 3.49 
1.5-2.49 54 3.94 
2.5-3.49 200 4.27 
3.5-4.49 292 4.32 






















- - .002* 
(.001) 




- - -9.99e-07† 
(5.94e-07) 






      
Time varying controls:      
∆ Criminal experience  - .001* 
(.001) 












































R-square 0.028 0.135 0.028 0.128 0.145 
† p<.10 *p <  .05 **p< .01  
[52] 
 
Table 4. OLS model predicting log daily rates (adjusted S.E). 
 B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) 
 1 2 3 4 5 




- - .002*** 
(.000) 




- - -6.96e-07*** 
(2.02e-07) 






      
Time varying controls:      












































  2.946*** 
(.598) 
      
R-square 0.120 0.237 0.102 0.213 0.250 
*p < . 05 **p< .01 ***p<.001 
Note: standard errors are cluster-corrected at the individual level. 
[53] 
 
Table 5. Fixed effects model predicting log daily wage rates.  
 B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) 
 1 2 3 4 5 




- - .001* 
(.001) 




- - -5.46e-07* 
(2.67e-07) 






      
Time varying controls:      














































      
Within R-square 0.042 0.108 0.038 0.113 0.121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
